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Magic thinking seems common in healthcare and nowhere is this more apparent than when it comes 
to the workforce. Employers and policy makers continue to search for a solution to the intractable 
challenge of how we can deal with more complex demand with a deficit of both hands and skills. We’d 
argue that they don’t always understand the problem they are trying to solve.  
The fundamental premise of workforce planning in healthcare is that the division of labour should be 
based primarily on technical competence; that is, a worker’s capability to complete a series of 
independent tasks of varying complexity in a standardised manner. A small number of decision makers 
determine the tasks that need to be completed through the development of guidelines, checklists, 
and protocols. The workforce is then assessed against a set of task competencies, but never against 
the need to balance competing tasks, or to consider the unintended consequences of one task on 
another aspect of the workload.  
This approach is based on Taylorism, a management theory that looked at how to maximise 
productivity and make work more measurable, efficient, and even controllable. It’s worth noting that 
Taylorism was developed in factories in a bid to increase the efficiency of workers and machines. In 
such a system, the workload is stable, predictable, and linear with little variability, but does it work 
for modern healthcare?  
Healthcare consists of a series of overlapping systems—of physiological and physical structures in 
parallel with psychological and social frameworks. The competency based approach, which reduces 
work to a series of independent tasks considered in the abstract, misses the complexity and the critical 
thinking that is essential to professional working.  
It also fails to consider that unlike manufacturing, each case in healthcare has a particular context. 
Patients are all unique and the resources that professionals have available fluctuate. Professionals 
have to manage finite resources to best manage the needs of a group of patients or a population 
rather than the needs of a single individual. For the best outcomes, we’d argue that the competency 
approach needs to be complemented by professional judgment. 
The limitations of relying entirely on competency based workforce approaches can be seen in the 
adoption of early warning scores (EWS). The first early warning score was  created in 1997 as an aid 
to assessing and detecting critical illness. Since then, it has developed into a mandatory task in the 
NHS, with an updated national early warning score (NEWS2) published and endorsed by NHS England 
and NHS Improvement in 2017 for use in acute and ambulance settings.  
The use of early warning scores is justified by studies that show associations between their 
introduction and apparent reductions in cardiac arrest. Yet, as always in science, associations are not 
sufficient explanation. Back in 1974 Richard Feynman warned against the pitfalls of assuming that 
visible artefacts associated with a desirable outcome are causal, calling this cargo cult science. Instead, 
we need to have a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that lead to observable outcomes—and 
the difficult truth that they may not always be amenable to direct measurement. Professional 
judgment is one of these confounding factors that may not be readily quantified. When we fail to 
recognise its role and reduce vital sign assessment to a technical task with a score, we may be doing 
more harm than good.  
In an increasingly competence based system, there is less and less value attached to professional 
expertise. McGaughey et al  found that when observations were delegated to healthcare assistants, 
meaning the EWS was not complemented by professional nursing judgment, the number of false 
positive calls went up, thereby increasing junior doctors’ workload. They also found instances of 
false negatives, where junior doctors refused early referrals based on nursing judgment because the 
EWS thresholds had not been triggered. In a recent systematic review, Gerry and colleagues point 
out the weakness of various EWS models. However, their adoption as a national approach means 
they are often given primacy over professional judgment, and debate around their use is unlikely to 
be welcome.  
As Dreyfus and Dreyfus have set out, professional judgment is the combination of theory and 
experience. Using well evidenced theory, an expert draws on their experience of both typical and 
atypical cases to subliminally match appropriate evidence to each given situation and whether that 
unique situation requires adaptations. 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s model applies to the whole healthcare workforce, but has particular 
resonance for nursing, which has, we’d argue, struggled to quantify its impact more than other 
healthcare professions. Nurses’ professional judgment and expertise has been repeatedly shown 
(Twigg et al; Needleman et al) to be associated with reduced mortality, length of stay, readmissions, 
admissions to residential care, and a raft of other outcomes. Yet nursing judgement is less amenable 
to being appraised by technical competencies and its expertise is often lost in discussions about the 
shape of the workforce.  
The profession’s value is often subsumed into concepts of “caring” (as though the other professions 
don’t care) and delivering technical tasks prescribed by others. The critical thinking skills it requires 
often go unseen. When nurses’ expertise isn’t recognised, the risk is that the skills their role requires 
are underestimated and the work is redistributed to roles that are cheaper, but with a different 
balance of theory and experience. 
We would suggest that the challenges of reducing professional practice to task delivery, which 
nursing is currently facing, will begin to impact other professions, including doctors, as the number 
of patients with multiple long term conditions rises. The complexity of these patients physiologically 
and socially means that the confounding variables become too numerous for a simple scoring 
system or pathway. While technology has the potential to crunch the evidence for individual cases, 
people living with long term conditions will increasingly need to make choices about the 
compromises they are willing to make. In reaching these decisions, professional judgment will likely 
be a better support to them than an algorithm. 
We are still dividing healthcare work according to a Taylorist model and struggling to understand 
why safety failures continue to happen. It’s time to reconsider our underlying assumptions about 
what makes an efficient and effective healthcare workforce, and to draw out how they can produce 
better outcomes for patients, rather than simply delivering activities and ticking boxes.  
 
 
 
